Christine A.R. MacNulty
presented at
Washington DC, September 1996


The information revolution has given us all manner of wonderful things, but it has also created a monster - information warfare. At its heart, information warfare is about people - as individuals and organizations. It is about their objectives and priorities, and it is about their vulnerabilities and fears. Within the context of information warfare, there are many different types of "weapons", many of them purely technological; but they do not provide all the answers for offense, and they do not provide even the primary answers for defense. We need to look behind the technology, to understand clearly what are the vulnerabilities of potential enemies and what are our own vulnerabilities as well. We need also to look at what we are actually prepared to do; to what degree are we willing to be other than "nice guys", and to what degree are we willing to give up aspects of our own freedom in the name of security.

These questions and others like them belong under the heading of "ethics in information warfare". But the notion of ethics - a set of moral principles - is not entirely static. It changes as peoples' values and beliefs change. For instance, following on from the Gulf War, the American people have come to expect wars to be "brief, bloodless bargains"; they are now very reluctant to see their sons and daughters brought home in body bags, even for the sake of the United States. This is a very different ethos from that which we had during WWII, Korea and at the start of the Vietnam War. Thus, as we think about the future of information warfare, we need to be aware of the social (values and beliefs) context in which information warfare, both offensive and defensive, will be played out.

We need also to consider the future of US national security, and to realize that it is concerned with much broader issues than global tensions and conflicts and potential threats from somewhere "out there". The future of US security is also a function of how we, as Americans, act (in all aspects of life, work, trade, education...) and how others react to us. This interaction is made possible by instantaneous communication and other information. While we have very limited direct control over what happens outside the US, we - as a society - do have control over what we ourselves do, the way we understand and deal with others, and the motivations we have. In the foreseeable future we can be confident that there will continue be conflicts in different parts of the world; equivalents of the crises in Kuwait, the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti...etc; some of those conflicts may even include the use of nuclear weapons. It seems to me that the most important thing is not to identify what conflicts will happen where and when, or even to develop contingency plans for appropriate responses. These activities are important and they should certainly be pursued; but it is even more important to develop a vision and a set of the principles that will form the basis for our responses. This is particularly true of the whole field of information warfare, for which little has been done so far.

The next part of my paper will describe some models we have been using to understand changing values and beliefs. The final part of the paper will focus on the implications of these changes for warfare and information warfare, and for the ethics associated with them.

Social Change - Changing Values and Motivations

Since the early '70's Applied Futures' studies of the future have included research into changing values, beliefs and motivations in the UK where our headquarters was located until 1993. Associates in other countries, including the United States, developed similar models. A brief overview of one of our social models will serve as a framework for our understanding of the changes taking place in society and their impacts on organizations.

The model we will consider is based on Abraham Maslow's theory of motivation and validated by data from periodic surveys of random samples of the UK population conducted since 1973. In the United States, similar surveys, conducted from 1968 - 1986 showed very similar results. Maslow's contention was that every individual has within his psychological framework a hierarchy of needs, as represented in the accompanying diagram. The individual must satisfy, at least in part, the needs at one level of the hierarchy before he can be even conscious of those at the next level. Maslow saw this as a process of development that takes place throughout life; so that by learning to satisfy the needs of progressive levels the individual can, in time, realize his full psychological potential. Maslow also made the distinction between "deficiency needs", which the individual perceives as some sort of lack, and "growth" needs, which are recognized as experiences needed for the realization of one's individual potential. This distinction is particularly significant when considering the future of global and national security, and we shall discuss it later. For the moment it will be useful to consider some other aspects of the model.

The fundamental idea which underlies Applied Futures' social model is that every individual possesses a set of values and beliefs which, if they change at all, change only slowly - as he works through the hierarchy of needs. These values and beliefs motivate almost everything the individual does. These long term values (by long term, we mean values which are held for a period of from five to twenty years) are manifest in the medium term as attitudes and lifestyles, and in the short term as behavior. In addition to these social values being the most fundamental driving force for change, it is the very fact that they change slowly that makes them so important and valuable when taking the longer term view; they are a relatively stable element in a world of "fast changing" data. Our model proposes that by understanding the values of individuals in a society and the way they are changing we can observe the sort of development taking place within that society, identify the way in which it is occurring and (in a general way) assess the manner in which the society will behave.

Conceptual Social Model

We recognize three major groupings of social values within the United Kingdom. As I mentioned above, colleagues abroad have reported similar groups in societies throughout Europe and North America, and their estimated size in each country is shown in the adjacent figure. We refer to these groups as inner directed, outer directed, and sustenance driven. In the following paragraphs we describe briefly the principal identifying characteristics of each of these groups, outline our understanding of their role in society, and suggest how we expect them to influence the future. While we do not have any survey data for the newly industrialized countries and the developing countries of the Third World, from observation of their societies we would anticipate that they are predominantly Sustenance Driven. The descriptors below will provide insight into how the people who espouse the different sets of values are likely to behave.

Inner Directed Group

The Inner Directed Group is so named because its members derive their sense of personal direction, their personal rewards, and their criteria for success from within themselves. The standards by which inner directeds measure themselves, and the world, tend not to be the materialistic standards of wealth, social class, income, status, or possession; but rather they are standards involving such things as integrity, honesty, quality, and appropriateness to the situation. Inner directeds are the most psychologically mature of the groups, yet they are still seeking greater maturity. Although most are not anti-materialistic, they consider people rather than things to be of paramount importance; so they tend to see people in ways which have far greater human significance than the social role of membership in a class or the economic role of producer/consumer.

Their introspection is a characteristic which makes these people very easy to misunderstand; and it is important not to confuse inner directedness with introversion or self-centeredness. Perhaps we should start by looking at what inner directed people do not do. In simple terms; they do not try to "keep up with the Joneses" - not in any respect. What they do is to try to maximize their own, individual, potential; but they generally seek to do that in a way which is not exploitive of others. In other words, they see life as a non-zero-sum game; and they recognize that " a non-zero-sum world you do not have to do better than the other player to do well for yourself."Thus, although the criteria by which they judge the world - and their own performance - are internal; they care for, and are careful not to exploit other people. On the other hand, when they perceive that injustice is being done, they can demonstrate "righteous anger" and will attempt to right wrongs.

The diagram of Maslow's hierarchy above indicates that inner directed needs are almost entirely "growth needs". Thus, it is not surprising to find inner directeds are concerned with personal growth and maturation, with individual freedom and with personal responsibility - particularly their own freedom and responsibilities. We have observed two types of inner directeds - the "autonomous" ones and the "caring" ones. In the UK and the US we have more of the autonomous variety, while in Scandinavia and the Netherlands we find the more caring inner directeds. We would see this difference as the cause behind the different approaches those countries take to issues such as social welfare.

Inner directed people are difficult to observe because the thing which distinguishes them from the rest of the population is their motivation rather than their behavior; and as a result of this the media has real difficulty in presenting inner directedness. Inner directeds tend to be self confident; and, although they are by no means anti-social, they do not feel obliged to conform to stereotyped social "norms". For this reason they can be found in urban or rural environments; doing all sorts of jobs from management to physical labor, although they make very good leaders; earning salaries ranging from "vast" to "marginal"; and enjoying the entire spectrum of recreational activities. What they are doing in common is getting on with their lives as seems best to them, and interfering with others as little as possible.

It seems likely that it is the combination of their self confidence and their inner sense of what is important in their lives which gives the inner directed group its significant role as "trend setters" in society. During the past twenty years almost every major trend in Western societies has been started by this group. The group has been growing slowly for the past twenty years; and, although the growth rate has slowed recently, we expect it to continue to grow slowly in most industrialized countries. It is just possible that, if industrialized countries experience significant immigration, then the proportion of inner directeds may decline, although we expect they will maintain significant influence.

Outer Directed Group

In contrast to inner directed people Outer Directed people rely heavily on external indicators of their own self worth. To put it another way, an outer directed person's concept of himself depends upon his being able to compare himself with others; and his self esteem depends upon finding himself to be "better off" - usually in some materialistic way. Since they are, in many ways, characterized by the idea that "you are what you consume," they form an easily visible group. Display, and particularly the display of possessions, is a necessary element in establishing their place in society; and this shows clearly in their homes, which tend to be neat, tidy and well organized, with their most prestigious possessions, particularly consumer goods, openly exhibited.

As the notation on Maslow's diagram indicates, outer directed needs are centered on esteem. Therefore, at work the outer directed person is conscious of, and seeks actively to acquire, status and the symbols related to it. Job titles, supervisory or managerial roles, private office space (even a cubicle by the production line on the shop floor), promotion opportunities, a personal secretary, a company car, a name on the door, etc. are all of interest to the outer directed employee. Such people are very much at home in structured, hierarchical organizations in which they can establish their position clearly and then display their position and measure their progress relative to others. In identifying themselves with a peer group in this way outer directeds automatically judge themselves to be up to the group's level, and they generally use the group as the source of the standards by which they judge their world. In this way it is important for them to be seen to be up to the standard by being in the right places, having the right friends, adopting the right behavior, and so on. Since their behavior figures prominently in the conventional social models of the 20th century, outer directeds are easily recognized by the media where they are shown to be "successful" or "exploitive" according to the frame of reference of the writer.

If this description makes the outer directeds seem shallow, that is because it reflects the essential aspect of display which is, by its nature, only skin deep. However, the people in this group are of vital social importance; they are the dynamo, the energy source in our society. They are the ones who feel the need to compete; who need to prove themselves against the opposition; who have the drive to win at virtually any cost. This outer directed energy is essential to business as it operates today and to society in general, if it is not to stagnate; and this is the positive side of outer directedness. This group grew very quickly during the '80's, although it declined a little during the recent recession, but now it appears to be bouncing back. However, for the next decade, at least, we expect it to continue to grow in most of the industrialized and in the rapidly developing countries.

Sustenance Driven Group

Everywhere we look in western industrial society the two groups which we have just considered are growing at the expense of a third group which we call the Sustenance Drivens. This pattern has been a consistent trend for some time. Because of its declining size, we consider the direct impact of the sustenance driven group on the long term future to be relatively small. However, they are influential at the moment, and to neglect them would be to miss the essential role by which they will influence the future. Indeed, if the industrialized countries experience significant immigration from the developing world, this group may increase in size.

Sustenance driven needs are deficiency needs, and the distinguishing characteristic of sustenance driven people is a desire to "hold what you've got". This orientation tends to make them form homogeneous groups with well defined characteristics and relatively impermeable boundaries. The typical picture that this idea brings to mind is the tightly knit, clannish, working class community; but a little reflection will indicate that these characteristics also describe a good many company directors of the "old school", a lot of the traditional "professions", not to say a good part of the hereditary peerage in the UK. In fact, we find that the sustenance driven groups include a substantial number of people from all these conventional classifications; and the thing that they have in common is that they resist change. Not only do they hold on to their possessions, but to their institutions as well. This group also (at least the "working class" members of the sustenance driven group) figures in orthodox social models and are frequently represented in the media as "exploited" or "recalcitrant" depending on the author's orientation.

From what we have said it is clear that a very substantial number of sustenance driven people control investment decisions, industrial relations (on both sides of the negotiating table), and the political, economic and legal framework. Essentially, what the sustenance driven people in this sort of position do to influence the future is to hold a brake on change. This function has real social value since it provides stability in the form of inertia which prevents inner directed innovation and outer directed energy from tearing society apart. On the other hand, this sort of brake is unlikely to stop the social changes which are now in progress; they are far too fundamental and will have been brewing far too long to be stopped at all.

Since we all recognize outer directed and sustenance driven types and since they are presented to us in the media, our world view often consists of these two groups in confrontation (if not conflict) with each other. We tend to miss the inner directeds and the part they play. In fact, inner directedness has been growing slowly but steadily for almost 20 years; and in some European countries as much as 30-40% of the population exhibit some inner directed characteristics. Because they are trend setters, what the inner directeds group does today, the outer directeds are likely to do in 2-5 years' time and the sustenance drivens some time beyond that. The inner directeds are innovators who provide the ideas and determine (by their individual actions, not by any conspiracy) the general direction in which the society will move. The outer directeds are dynamos and provide the energy and drive which will push the change through to its completion; while the sustenance drivens are inhibitors who provide the inertia which prevents the whole social system from flying apart.

It is important to understand that these statements of function are not value judgments. Nor is it sufficient to think of these groups as being in competition one with another, although the sustenance drivens, particularly, might be prone to that view. Rather it is necessary to take a systems view of society and understand that each of these functions is both essential and beneficial to the overall well-being of society. We are looking at a symbiosis in which the sustenance driven keep the outer directeds in check, while the outer directeds in their turn provide a focus which prevents an inner directed evaporation into personal space. Conversely, the inner directeds constantly provide the outer directeds with new ideas and opportunities, while the outer directeds in their turn provide the energy to drive businesses which service their material needs and those of the sustenance drivens. What we have here, in fact, is a view of the great dynamic of society; it is the interplay of these three forces which really keeps the wheels moving throughout our industrialized world and which, in our view, provides the major driving force for change.

An Alternate View of Society

There is another view of society, complementary to our own, which I will introduce here because I believe it will enrich our understanding of some of the issues involved in national security. The Dutch anthropologist, Geert Hofstede , has analyzed the cultural differences between 50 countries, using four different cultural dimensions: Power Distance Index (PDI), Individualism (IDV), Masculinity Index (MAS), and Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI). He has rated each country on a scale from 0 to 100.

Using the mapping technique which we employ to diagram our own model of the values in the UK, one of my colleagues has combined these different dimensions into a single map whose abscissa is given by the dimension PDI to IDV (UAI comes out to be close to PDI) and the ordinate by the scale MAS. In this representation of the data we have plotted the MAS (masculinity) scale as "Maternalism" since, reversed in that way, the map correlates very nicely with a second of our social models (which we have not space to discuss here). A glance at the figure below will give an indication of the characteristics of each part of the "value space". The "Scandinavian" group is both "individualistic" and "caring", and the highly developed social welfare systems of those countries is an easily available confirmation of those values. The "British" group (including the USA) is also "individualistic", but this group is more inclined to expect people to "take care of themselves". The "Germanic" group is rather more "institutional" and less "caring", while the "Gallic" and "Balkan" groups are progressively more compliant and dependent on social support. Your own knowledge of these countries will enable you to enrich your understanding of this value space.

When the other countries are mapped into the same space the similarities and differences between them becomes apparent. While this gives only a single snapshot of the countries, nonetheless the fact that all the Western countries are in the east of the map - the area of individualism - confirms the sort of individual development that Maslow identified. The groupings Hofstede found of Scandinavian countries in the more maternal part of the map fit with our view of "caring" inner directeds, while the UK and US are more inclined to be "autonomous" inner directed, and are much less maternal.

There are two important things to note here. The first is that the countries which have democracies which work reasonably well tend to be in the eastern part of the map. This fits with an idea we have had which suggests that democracies and market economies are really effective only in countries in which a substantial number of people begin to adopt inner directed values. Japan, which has experienced a large shift from sustenance driven to outer directed values in the last 45 years, seems to be an exception to this idea. We are inclined to think that the prominent role which its long standing spiritual tradition has played in Japanese life has had an effect similar to a substantial inner directed population in other societies. The second important element to note here is that almost all the countries in the world which are experiencing conflict and problems are in the hierarchical (PDI, western) part of the map. This fits with our idea that most of those countries are sustenance driven. Their people respond to authority, they are not likely to take individual risks unless they are told to do so by the country's leader, and then they will do so unquestioningly. Although almost all these countries have adopted the trappings of democracy, they will not find it easy to operate that system smoothly; and they will probably exhibit characteristics which will limit the growth and success of their market economies.

Deficiency Needs, Growth Needs and National Security in General

We at Applied Futures would not pretend that a view based on a hierarchy of psychological needs is the most comprehensive, or even the best, way of looking at world events. On the other hand, this frame of reference enables us to consider some issues which are important if we are to see global and national security from a different perspective and to ask some useful questions which other models do not suggest. We would like to introduce these ideas at this time.

In preparation for a colloquium on Global and National Security, several years ago, we tried to examine the nature of conflict in terms of Maslow's model. We came to the conclusion that every type of conflict that we could think of occurred because of deficiency needs, or a perception of some deficiency. This is certainly true of the wars fought over land, resources, access...etc. It is also true of religious wars, of wars fought over "rights", and of wars fought for personal aggrandizement (i.e. need of some warlord/dictator for the esteem of others).

Now, if we look to see what is happening in the world we see that most of the countries in the industrialized world are on the boundary edge between deficiency and growth needs. And most of them are no longer willing to fight - in the conventional sense, at least - over deficiencies; although they may go to war over principle. Instead we see a country like Japan, with its concern for self esteem, engaging in economic wars with the US and Europe which, in return, try to defend their own self esteem. We see some of the countries of Europe (those which still have significant deficiency-need tendencies) battling with the UK and Denmark (which are a little further into the growth needs) over the business of a federal Europe. The whole idea of the need for a federal Europe (as opposed to a free trade zone) is itself a deficiency need; and from this perspective the conflict lies between those in power who see deficiencies, and those in the rest of society who have already moved well into the growth needs.

As I mentioned earlier, our model applies in principle to most of the industrialized world. While we have of some reservations about applying our model to every country and culture, it seems to us that most of the newly industrialized countries are moving very quickly from sustenance driven values and into outer directed ones, while less developed countries (including the CIS countries, as well as third world countries) seem to be still very much sustenance driven. That confirms the view that there is substantial potential for conflict in the developing world. To the extent that the western industrial societies are inclined to become involved with the developing nations - in terms of investment, assistance, or some similar programs, it is important for them to be aware of, and be sensitive to, the values and motivations of the societies in which they operate. If they fail to do so, they may well precipitate unanticipated hostilities.

The US is very much on that border between deficiency and growth needs. It also has a very large number of people whose values are well into the growth area; they are very articulate and influential people in all walks of life including government and the Armed Forces. Over the next decade or so we might expect their numbers and influence to increase. This means that the policies that will be adopted by the US in the medium term future are difficult to anticipate. We shall need to understand what this shift in values likely to do to the willingness, or unwillingness, of US citizens (and hence, Congress) to authorize action to prevent, avoid or engage in conflict of different kinds, in different theaters, or to be involved in humanitarian assistance. I should mention here that most inner directed people do not have any problem with the Armed Forces, or with military solutions to problems. However they are far more likely to ask such questions as, "Do we really understand the long term implications of this intervention - for us as well as for the other country?" We also need to think about what kinds of solutions people will want for dealing with threats from countries which have acquired weapons of mass destruction, be they strategic weapons, or small ones likely to be used by terrorists. In fact, offensive information warfare may well play a major role in this kind of situation.

On the other hand, if the US experiences increasing immigration from developing nations, then the proportion of sustenance driven people in the population will increase, and the influence of the existing sustenance driven population will increase also. This may well exacerbate confrontations within the US between those with growth needs and those with deficiency needs. These confrontations might play out in Congress, and in Congressional elections and Presidential elections. The resulting uncertainties could result in indecision and ambiguous policies. This could also cause the United States to become more inward looking, at least for a time, and more willing to adopt government solutions to problems.

Implications of Changing Values and Beliefs for Information Warfare

We may assume that, in the next 10 - 20 years, we shall see approximately a third of the population in the United States (and most of the other industrialized nations) with inner directed values, a third with outer directed values, and a third with sustenance driven ones. This will also be true of members of Congress, the Administration and the members of the Armed Forces. Thus we can expect that there will be significant differences of opinion amongst the leaders of the country and the Armed Forces about what should be done, and how information warfare should be conducted. From the point of view of defense against information warfare, there will also be significant differences, especially over the role of government.

Offensive Information Warfare

As an outsider - a civilian and a Brit (at least at the moment) - I do not see any evidence of information warfare being viewed as a total system of warfare. In part, this is probably because it is new, but it is probably because, even now, there is a reluctance on the part of many Americans (and Britons) to do things that are sneaky and underhand, like psyops, for instance. Americans are nice guys, and they want to be seen as nice guys; still, they do sneaky things when they must. Many people, for example, see sniping as sneaky and underhand, but it is a necessary part of warfare, especially in urban environments. It seems to me that if we were to develop policy and doctrine for information warfare that covered the whole gamut from deterrence and prevention through to containment and compellence, we would have strong basis from which to begin to think about the ethical problems associated with it. We might be able to distinguish between what is sneaky but necessary, and what may not be necessary. In the absence of that sort of doctrine, or systems perspective, we can only offer solutions to ad hoc ethics problems. That is what I shall attempt to do here.

The nature of future warfare

The inner and outer directeds have different views here. For the inner directed, human life is sacred. It can be expended for principle but not for a purely economic interest. Economic interest might be part of a larger reason for going to war, but to get the inner directeds on board, the whole future of the nation would have to be at stake. For this reason inner directeds are more likely to prefer to engage in information warfare (in all its forms) than in armed conflict. While the collapse of a nation's infrastructure might cause significant human problems and some collateral damage, depending on the target of the information warfare, the devastation is likely to be less significant than that caused by prolonged armed conflict. In addition, the inner directeds have always been the most information aware and IT knowledgeable. More than the other groups in society, they see things from "systems perspectives"; and they are the most willing to use their imaginations. They are likely to be able to develop some of the most innovative ideas for all aspects of information warfare. Indeed, they are very likely to be able to find ways of "precision targeting" the enemy. For the inner directeds, psychological warfare and misinformation are not likely to be regarded as sneaky and underhand, but as legitimate ways of deterring or preventing something worse. If a significant proportion of the population were inner directed, we might see a force which combines information warfare and special operations become a principle part of the military establishment.

The outer directeds and sustenance drivens are likely to be more willing to engage in armed conflict for economic and other national interests, as well as for principle. They are also more likely to regard information warfare as an adjunct to conventional warfare, rather than something in its own right. This is likely to be as true of members of Congress and the Administration as it is of members of the Armed Forces. Because of this traditional view, some of these people are likely to regard information warfare as sneaky and even un-American, and so there may be great resistance to some aspects of it from members of these groups.

Because of these conflicting views we need to develop doctrine and policy that cover the ways in which information warfare can be employed and offer some guidance about the circumstances in which it should not be used. We need to do some clear thinking on these issues now. In time of war commanders in the field are presented with sufficient ambiguity by the nature of the battlefield, itself. They need clear understanding about the employment of the information warfare weapons available to them so that (even if CNN is looking over their shoulders) their mission objectives can be their guiding principles.


So far I have spoken about information warfare where it is clear that nations are at war. It is in the nature of information warfare that it may not be entirely clear when we are at war or with whom. Thus the question of intelligence, with all the issues of ethics associated with its gathering, raises its head. To what degree will the three groups in society be willing to undertake electronic eavesdropping on organizations in other nations and in their own? I will discuss some aspects of this later under Defensive Information Warfare, but some comments are appropriate here.

It tends to be the inner directeds who want completely open information systems, no controls, no censorship, freedom to encrypt as they choose..etc. This is partly because they want to be able to access all manner of information, and partly because they see controls and censorship as the thin end of a very thick wedge - the limitation of freedom. The outer directeds and sustenance driven people are less concerned by such issues, more concerned with security, and are more likely to accept government measures.

But if the inner directeds are so reluctant to see government intervention, how will they view electronic eavesdropping on people in other nations, even if it is done in the name of defense? How will they view it being done in this country, by agents looking to see whether organizations' files have been the subject of intrusion or manipulation - to see whether someone is at war with us? For the inner directeds, curtailment of individual freedom and invasion of privacy are both significant issues.

It is likely that inner directeds would accept electronic eavesdropping and other intrusions into other nation's information systems, if they were convinced that it would enable them to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. But there would have to be sufficient conventional intelligence available to suggest that these additional measures were necessary.

They would probably not mind the idea of a national agency looking through their own files to see whether someone had intruded or altered things, provided they would not be prosecuted for some minor, unintentional offenses discovered through the search (see more below).

The main point here is that there would have to be compelling evidence before they gave their agreement to engage in intelligence activities beyond those currently employed both overseas and at home.

Defensive Information Warfare

Defensive information warfare is about prevention, protection and detection. The inner directeds would argue that, unless national security were at risk because of a loss of infrastructure, then these tasks are the responsibility of each individual organization, and that if the organization wanted assistance from the government that would be fine; but if they didn't, inner directeds would not want it forced on them. But inner directeds would want to be able to develop firewalls, company procedures and protocols, and use whatever encryption methods they chose. On the other hand, although they would use these technological methods, they would also ask themselves "exactly what information do we really need to protect and why?" Inner directeds are more likely than the other groups to believe in the old adage "open doors confound the wicked". Intuitively, they would prefer to have everything as open as possible. They don't mind giving ideas away, as they regard them like flowers - the more you pick them, the more they grow. So they would protect very little, but that "very little" they would protect very carefully; and would want to do it themselves.

If there were compelling reasons for them to allow the government to intervene in their telecommunications and information systems, then they would do so. On the other hand, they would object strongly to unsought government "assistance". They would regard this as highly unethical interference.

Outer directed and sustenance drivens would want to protect everything from everyone, as they are much more concerned about their competitive positions. They would be more willing to accept government advice about technological defenses and encryption procedures. And, if they didn't think about it very thoroughly, they would allow the government to eavesdrop for security purposes. On the other hand, a handful of companies which were seen to be prosecuted for minor, perhaps unintentional, offenses discovered during such eavesdropping, or during an FBI "fish-bowl" investigation or other government intervention, would cause these people to change their minds, and to use the courts to keep the government out. When the government engages in activities of this sort it leaves itself open to the accusation that the information is being misused.


There are no easy answers to any of the problems posed by information warfare, including ethics. Those problems are much larger than the security issues which define the terms in which they are usually discussed. We can probably say that offensive information warfare is properly in the purview of the government, particularly the armed forces and the intelligence agencies. The doctrines and policies they develop should not be based on technology alone; they should be broadly based and should include the social considerations outlined above in order to address both the ethics, and to understand potential enemies' vulnerabilities. Defensive information warfare, unlike warfare of other sorts, cannot be left solely to the government. It must be seen as the business of every organization likely to be a target.

Technological solutions will certainly play a major role in the defense against attacks on the information infrastructure. However, technological solutions will by no means be sufficient. The fundamental solutions lie in the way in which business conducts its internal and external activities. These activities are the responsibility of the CEO's and COO's; they are strategic considerations - beyond the purview of the IT and Data Processing Managers. Successful defense against information warfare will require, in addition to technical expertise, the participation of the most creative and imaginative people in the organization. It will also require a redefinition of the organization's composition, structure, training, and procedures formulated in the context of the potential threat. Each solution will have to comply with the law, and so some input from the government will be necessary. Indeed, good solid discussion with people from various government agencies would be very desirable. Each of these comprehensive solutions can and should be unique to the organization which develops it. Nonetheless, while plans are being developed substantial benefit will be realized from an exchange of ideas between organizations across industry boundaries.